

REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT KISUMU
CIVIL APPEAL NO. E271 OF 2024

LOREEN ABIRE OGULA 1ST APPELLANT
KITUKU ALIVIDZAH 2ND APPELLANT
- VERSUS -
GRACE ACHIENG OMONDI RESPONDENT

(Being an appeal from the judgment and decree of Hon. E.A. Obina SPM delivered on the 5/12/2024 in Kisumu CMCC No. 30 of 2013, Grace Achieng Omondi v Loreen Abire Ogula & Another)

J U D G M E N T

1. The respondent filed the primary suit before the trial court vide an amended plaint dated **21/2/2013**. She claimed for general damages and costs of the suit for injuries sustained following a road traffic accident.
2. The 1st appellant entered appearance and filed a statement of defence dated **22/8/2017** in which she denied the respondent's claim and put the respondent to strict proof of the same.
3. The matter proceeded to trial and by a judgment delivered on **5/12/2024**, the trial court decreed: -

a) Liability at 100% for the respondent against the 1st appellant.

b) General damages Kshs. 220,000/-

- c) Costs of the suit and interest at court rates.*
4. Being dissatisfied with the said judgment/decree, the appellants lodged this appeal vide the Memorandum of Appeal dated **20/12/2024** and raised six (6) grounds of appeal as follows: -
- a) The learned trial magistrate erred in fact and in law in failing to appreciate the evidence of the defendants thereby finding the defendants 100% liable, leading to miscarriage of justice.*
- b) The learned trial magistrate greatly misdirected himself by ignoring and treating the submissions of the defendants on liability superficially thereby arriving at the wrong conclusion on liability.*
- c) The quantum of general damages for loss of amenities is oppressive and punitive and amounts to miscarriage of justice as the plaintiff was not amongst those involved in the accident.*
- d) The learned trial magistrate ignored the appellant's submissions, paid lip service and made no reference to all the precedent on general damages cited before him, thus coming to a wrong decision on quantum.*

e) The learned magistrate considered extraneous circumstances to arrive at the erred findings in law and in fact.

f) The Honourable magistrate's decision is plainly wrong and is against the weight of evidence.

5. The appeal was disposed off by written submissions which I have duly considered.
6. This being a first appeal, the Court is duty bound to evaluate the evidence afresh and come to its own independent findings and conclusions but at all times having in mind that it did not have the advantage of seeing the witnesses testify. See **Selles & Anor v Associated Motor Boat Co Ltd & Others [1968] EA 123.**
7. Before the trial court, neither of the parties called witnesses in support of their cases. On the contrary, when the matter came up for hearing on the **3/10/2024**, the parties entered into a consent whereby the respondent's statement dated **10/12/2012** was adopted as her evidence in chief, her list and bundle of documents dated **10/12/2012** was produced as her evidence, the 2nd medical report by **Dr. James Ogolah** was produced as defence exhibit 1. Both parties then closed their respective cases.

8. It is therefore clear that the trial before the trial court was by way of documentary evidence. It is based on this evidence that the trial court rendered its decision. From the foregoing, the grounds of appeal may be summarized into one, viz, ***‘that the trial court misdirected itself in ignoring the evidence, submissions, authorities and principles applicable on liability and quantum and consequently came to a wrong conclusion on the same’***.
9. On liability, the 1st appellant was held 100% liable for causing the accident. In **Ndatho v Chebet (Civil Appeal 8 of 2020) [2022] KEHC 346 (KLR) (16 March 2022) (Judgment)**, the court reiterated Lord Reid’s statement in ***Stapley v Gypsum Mines Limited (2) (1953) A.C 663 at P. 681***, wherein he stated thus: -

“To determine what caused an accident from the point of view of legal liability is a most difficult task. If there is any valid logical or scientific theory of causation, it is quite irrelevant in this connection. In a court of law, this question must be decided as a properly instructed and reasonable jury would decide it ... The question must be determined by applying common sense to the fact of each particular case. One may find that a matter of history, several people have been at fault and that if anyone of them had

acted properly the accident would not have happened, but that does not mean that the accident must be regarded as having been caused by the faults of all of them. One must discriminate between those faults which must be discarded as being too remote and those which must not. Sometimes, it is proper to discard all but one and to regard that one as the sole cause, but in other cases it is proper to regard two or more as having jointly cause the accident. I doubt whether any test can apply generally.”

10. The general rule is that he who alleges must prove. That is the gist of ***section 107 (1) of the Evidence Act, Cap 80 Laws of Kenya***. In ***Anne Wambui Ndiritu v Joseph Kiprono Ropkoi & Another [2005] 1 EA 334***, the Court of Appeal held that: -

“As a general proposition under section 107 (1) of the Evidence Act, Cap 80, the legal burden of proof lies upon the party who invokes the aid of the law and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue. There is however the evidential burden that is case upon any party the burden of proving any particular fact which he desires the court to believe in its existence which is captured in Sections 109 and 112 of the Act.”

11. In the present case therefore, it was the respondent's duty to produce evidence and prove that the 1st appellant was liable for causing the accident that led to the injuries complained of.
12. In her witness statement dated **10/12/2012**, the respondent stated that on the **14/11/2012** she was travelling along the Kisumu – Busia road aboard matatu registration number **KAH 723B** when at around the Molasses Plant area, she saw a motor vehicle registration number **KBS 473J** coming from the opposite direction that was being driven at a very high speed and which later lost control move in a zig zag manner before it collided with the rear of a matatu that was in front of them and thereafter collided head on with the matatu in which she was in. That as a result of the accident she sustained serious injuries. She blamed the 1st appellant's vehicle for the accident.
13. There was no testimony on how the accident occurred by the 1st appellant who instead produced a 2nd medical report as her only evidence. As such the court was left with only the version presented by the respondent. Therefore, the respondent's case remained proved as presented before the trial court.
14. Without there being any evidence to counter the respondent's evidence could the trial court err in holding the appellant 100% liable? I don't think

- so. There was no evidence that was tendered to show how the respondent could have or did actually contribute to the accident.
15. Accordingly, the trial court's holding the 1st appellant liable at 100% cannot be faulted. In **Acceller Global Logistics vs Gladys Nasembu Waswa & Another (2020) KEHC 9074 (KLR)**, it was held that where there is no evidence called by the defence, the plaintiff's case remains uncontroverted.
 16. The foregoing is the correct position in law where no evidence is called to support the denials in a defence. Such a defence cannot stand on the face of tested evidence of a plaintiff. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in holding the appellant 100% liable in circumstances.
 17. The 1st appellant impugned the trial court's judgment on quantum terming it excessive. The law on the circumstances under which an appellate court will interfere with an award of quantum by the trial court is settled. That an appellate court will only interfere with an award of damages if; ***in exercising its discretion the trial court misdirected itself in some matters and arrived at an erroneous decision, or was clearly wrong in the exercise of that judicial discretion which resulted into injustice.*** See **Mbogo & another Vs Shah (1968) EA** and **Mkube v Nyamuro [1983] KLR 403.**

18. In Loice Wanjiku Kagunda v Julius Gachau Mwangi CA 142/2003 (unreported), the Court of Appeal observed that: -

“We appreciate that the assessment of damages is more like an exercise of judicial discretion and hence an appellate court should not interfere with an award of damages unless it is satisfied that the judge acted on wrong principles of law or has misapprehended the facts or has for those other reasons made a wholly erroneous estimate of the damages suffered. The question is not what the appellate court would award but whether the lower court acted on the wrong principles (see Manga vs Musila [1984] KLR 257).”

19. Further, in Kemfro Africa Ltd -Vs- A.M. Lubia and Another (1988) KAR 722, the Court of Appeal stated: -

“The Principles to be observed by an appellate court in deciding whether it is justified in disturbing the quantum of damages awarded by a trial judge were held by the former Court of Appeal of Eastern Africa to be that it must be satisfied that either the Judge, in assessing the damages took into account an irrelevant factor or left out of account a relevant one, or that, short of this, the amount is so inordinately low or so inordinately high that it must be a wholly

erroneous estimate of the damage. The same position was taken in Denshire Muteti Wambui V. KPLC (2013) eKLR.”

20. In her amended plaint, the respondent pleaded that she sustained the following injuries;

a) Blunt head injury.

b) Damage of the anterior aspect of both lower limbs with haematoma involving the tibia/Fibula.

21. In the P3 form produced by her, it was noted that she had sustained blunt injuries to the neck, head, back, chest, tenderness on the upper arm and tenderness and bruises on the right lower arm. The same injuries were similarly noted in the medical report dated **23/11/2012** by **Dr. Manasseh O. Onyimbo**. The evidence thus pointed to the respondent having sustained soft tissue injuries.

22. The appellants' case is that the trial court's award of **Kshs. 220,000/-** was excessive.

23. This Court has considered the submissions and authorities relied on by both parties on the award for damages. The Court considers the following cases as being comparable to the instant suit: -

- a) In Catherine Wanjiru Kingori & 3 others v Gibson Theuri Gichuri [2005] eKLR, the 3rd plaintiff suffered multiple soft tissue injuries on the left elbow frame and injuries on both ankles and was awarded **Kshs. 350,000/-** as general damages.
- b) In Ogembo & Anor v Maisa (2023) KEHC 436(KLR), the injuries consisted of soft tissue injuries and two degloving injuries. The Court awarded **Kshs. 300,000/-**.
- c) In Khetia Draper Ltd v Chesoli [2025] KEHC 3718 (KLR) the plaintiff sustained minor to moderate soft tissue injuries and the High Court upheld an award of **Kshs. 250,000/-** as general damages.
24. From the foregoing, it is not correct to term the award made by the trial court as excessive. In light of injuries suffered, the award of **Kshs. 220,000/-** cannot be said to be excessive and is comparable with the awards given in the cases referred to above.
25. The appellant impugned the trial court's judgment on the ground that it ignored her submissions or treated them superficially thus arriving at the wrong decision. It is trite that submissions, arguments, or assertions made by counsel in court are not evidence. Evidence must be presented through witness testimony, affidavits, or production of documents in accordance with

the Evidence Act, and submissions cannot act as a substitute for this legal requirement

26. The upshot of the above is that the appeal is without merit and is therefore dismissed with costs to the respondent.

It is so decreed.

DATED and **DELIVERED** at Kisumu this 30th day of **April, 2026**.

A. MABEYA, FCI Arb

JUDGE