



Republic v Kenya Wildlife Service & 2 others; YAH (Ex parte Applicant) (Minor Suing thro’ the Next Friend Adan Hafura Happi) (Judicial Review E009 of 2025) [2025] KEHC 15198 (KLR) (Judicial Review) (27 October 2025) (Judgment)

Neutral citation: [2025] KEHC 15198 (KLR)

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT AT ISIOLO
JUDICIAL REVIEW
JUDICIAL REVIEW E009 OF 2025
SC CHIRCHIR, J
OCTOBER 27, 2025**

BETWEEN

REPUBLIC APPLICANT

AND

KENYA WILDLIFE SERVICE 1ST RESPONDENT

**COUNTY WILDLIFE CONSERVATION & COMPENSATION COMMITTEE,
SAMBURU 2ND RESPONDENT**

**DIRECTOR, MINISTERIAL CONSERVATION COMMITTEE 3RD
RESPONDENT**

AND

YAH EX PARTE APPLICANT

MINOR SUING THRO’ THE NEXT FRIEND ADAN HAFURA HAPPI

JUDGMENT

1. The Applicant’s Notice of Motion Seeks orders as follows;
 - a). That the Honourable Court be pleased to grant an order of Judicial Review by way of Mandamus compelling the 1st Respondents , through the 2nd respondent (CMCC) to deliberate upon the exparte claim lodged on 20th 28TH July 2023 within the next 30 days pursuant to Regulation 27(1) (2) of the Wildlife Conservation and Management Compensation Regulations 2017.



- b). That the 1st respondent to report to this Honourable court its decision and/or deliberation under prayer (1) above on or before the expiry of 30 days from the date of issuance of this order.
- c). An order of Mandamus be issued to compel the respondents and specifically 1st respondent to pay the ex parte applicant the sum of Kshs. 2,000,000/= recommended, verified by the 2nd respondent and approved by the 3rd respondent as compensation for the injuries sustained by the ex-parte applicant in compliance with Regulations 27(1) (2) ,30(1)
- d). That the 1st respondent be and is hereby ordered comply with by paying the ex-parte applicant the said approved sum within 14 days from the date of issuance of the order of mandamus.
- e). Costs of and incidental to the application be provided for.
- f). Such further and/or other reliefs that this Honourable court may deem just and expedient to grant.

The Applicant's case

2. It is the applicant's case that on 19th April 2023 the minor Applicant was attacked by a crocodile as she watered livestock at Ewaso Nyiro River within Isiolo county. She sustained injuries as a result. She submitted her claim to the 1st Respondent.
3. The Applicant states that pursuant to Regulation 27 (1) of the Wildlife Conservation and Management Compensation Regulations of 2017 (The Regulations), the 2nd respondent is obligated to verify and recommend compensation for the applicant in the sum of Kshs. 2,000,000/= within 30 days of the submission of claim form.
4. That the 1st Respondent has been reluctant, and is uncooperative, in compelling the 2nd respondent to do the verification and recommendation as aforesaid.
5. That he has made visits to the office of the 1st respondent's offices in Isiolo county on diverse dates, but no information has been forthcoming from the 1st respondent on the fate of his claim. He seeks an order compelling the respondents to deliberate on his claim and to proceed to make payment

The 1st Respondent's case

6. The Application is opposed through the Affidavit of the 1st respondent's legal officer, one Gideon Mutai.
7. It is the respondent's case that the Application is defective as it contravenes the provisions of section 9(2) of the *Fair Administrative Action Act* (FAAA) as to the remedies available and Rule 11(1) of the rules thereunder, as to the form of Application; that it cannot be compelled to do that which it has no statutory duty to do. It is further stated that to the contrary, it is the duty of the 2nd respondent, as established under section 18 of the Act, to deliberate on, and make recommendations on claims resulting from loss or damage, caused by wild life. It is further stated that the 1st respondent only offer secretarial services to the 2nd respondent, and that the duty to finally disburse pay the claim , belongs to the Cabinet secretary in charge of Tourism and wildlife (The cabinet secretary). It is finally stated that the 1st respondent has performed its duty ,by receiving the Applicant's claim.
8. The other two respondents did not file any response.
9. The Application proceeded by way of written submissions.



Appellant's submissions

10. It is the Applicant's submissions that the respondent cannot invoke the provisions of section 9 of FAAA, yet there is no evidence that the Applicant's claim as ever been deliberated upon by the respondents; that the Applicant is bound to follow the procedure laid down in the Act only after the Applicant's claim has been deliberated upon. That the essence of the present Application is to compel the respondent, who has authority over the 2nd respondent, to deliberate the claim, as provided for under the Regulations.
11. The Applicant submits that the 1st Respondent is clothed with Authority over the 2nd Respondent and in this regard has relied on the case of Republic vs Kenya Wildlife Service & County Conservation & Compensation Committee, Kiambu & Director, Ministerial Conservation Compensation Committee and Joyce Wangui Muhia, Joseph Boru & Ano vs Kenya wildlife services & Rift valley Agricultural contractors (citations not provided), among others
12. On the relationship between the 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents, it is pointed out that the 2nd respondent is the Agent of the 1st respondent and therefore the court should compel the 1st respondent who is the principal, to order the 2nd respondent to verify his claim and make appropriate recommendations. The Applicant has relied on section 16 of the wildlife conservation and management Act (The Act) which provides that the Board of trustees of the 1st respondent is responsible for the payment and allowances for the committees set up under section 18 of the Act, which include the 2nd respondent herein.
13. On whether the 1st respondent is a necessary party to the suit, the applicant has relied on the case of K W S -Vs- Joseph Musyoki Kalonzo (2017) eKLR where it was held inter alia that the "Neither the Court nor the parties should concern themselves with the internal arrangements of the appellant as to whether it is the CEO of the appellant or the cabinet secretary who should disburse the money." The Appellant in the cited case was the 1st respondent herein.
14. Finally on whether the orders sought should be granted the Applicant submits that an order of mandamus is an appropriate remedy, where a statutory body has failed to carry its duty under statute, to the detriment of a party to whose the duty it is owed.

Respondent's submissions

15. It is the 1st respondent submissions it is not statutory mandated to direct the 2nd defendant to convene and deliberate on claims arising from attacks by wildlife; that pursuant to the provisions of section 18 of the Act, the statutory mandate to constitute and direct the 2nd respondent to convene and deliberate on claims arising from wildlife- human conflict is vested with the cabinet secretary. That this can be discerned from the fact that the majority of the committee members are appointees of the Cabinet secretary. It is further submitted that in terms of section 18(3) of the Act, the person to direct the 2nd respondent to sit and deliberate on claims is the cabinet secretary, and not the 1st respondent. And finally, it is stated that the person to make the pay-outs is the same cabinet secretary.
16. The 1st respondent further submits that the Applicant has not demonstrated that the 1st respondent has a statutory obligation to compensate him; that an order of mandamus can only issue where the applicant establishes a statutory duty on the part of the duty-bearer. In this regard the decision in the case of Republic – Vs – Kenya Vision 2030 Delivery Board & Another Exparte. Eng. Judah Abekah (2015) 7078 (KLR) has been relied on.



17. On the demand for payment of Kshs. 2,000,000/= as compensation, it is submitted that the claim is premature and misplaced, as the applicant is yet to exhaust avenue of redress provided under Section 25 of the Act and Regulation 27(2) of the Regulations . It is further submitted that the Application violates the exhaustion principle and further in breach of the section 9 (1) (2) of the FAAA. It is argued that the applicant must first exhaust the available remedies provided under statute before resorting to the court process. The case of Peter Muturi Njuguna - Vs- Kenya Wildlife Service (2017) KECA 42 (KLR) has been relied on , in this regard.
18. The parties have relied on several other various Authorities which I have considered.

Analysis and determination

19. I have considered the pleadings as well as the rival submissions. In my view the following issues arise for determination:
- a). Whether the respondents have statutory obligation to review and pay the Applicant's claim
 - b). Whether an order for compensation should be made.
 - c). What appropriate orders should issue.

Respondent's statutory obligations to the Applicant

20. The applicant was attacked by a crocodile at Ewaso Nyiro river as she was watering domestic Animals. The claim was reported to the 1st respondent.
21. The process of compensation is set out under section 25 of the Act. It begins with the claimant submitting the claim documents to the committee (the 2nd Respondent), established under section 18 of the Act .The committee is supposed to verify the claim within 30 days of receipt of documents and make recommendation to the Cabinet Secretary. The Cabinet Secretary is supposed to make payments within 30 days of receiving the advice of the committee.
22. It is the applicant's case that despite having dully submitted his claim, the 2nd respondent has not verified or reviewed it so as to facilitate payment. That it is the role of the 1st respondent to direct the 2nd respondent to initiate the verification process.
23. On the other hand, the 1st respondent insists that it has no mandate to direct the 2nd respondent in the said exercise, and that, giving such a directive is the work of the cabinet secretary. That the cabinet secretary is the one to direct the committee to sit and do the deliberations. The 1st respondent has based its argument on section 18(3) of the Act and the fact that the cabinet is the appointing Authority of most of the members of the committee.
24. I have considered the Respondent's submissions in this regard. Firstly, there is nowhere in the Act stating that the cabinet secretary directs the 2nd respondent to sit. Section 18, which the 1st Respondent is relying on provides for the setting up of county compensation committees, and prescribes the number of meetings that the committee can hold in a year. Section 18(3) that the respondent has referred to should be read with section 18(2). The relevant portions of section 18 s are hereby reproduced:
18. Community Wildlife Conservation Committees
Each County shall have Wildlife Conservation Committee of—



- (2) The Community Wildlife Conservation Committees may hold a maximum of four meetings every financial year
- (3) Despite subsection (2), additional meetings may be held with the prior consent of the Cabinet Secretary.
25. Thus Section 18(2) is a general prescription on the number of meetings that a committee of every county must hold in a given year, and then, any additional meetings must be with the approval of the cabinet secretary. To suggest that section 18(3) implies that the cabinet secretary is the one directing the sittings of the committee is an exaggerated and wrong interpretation of the section. In any case the functions of the committee as can be seen in section 19 is not just to deliberate on the claims. Apart from verifying the claims, the committees is also charged with, among others, development and implementation, in collaboration with the Service and Community Wildlife Associations, mechanisms for mitigation of human wildlife conflict. It is also charged with bringing together relevant stakeholders, to harness participation in conservation and management programmes of wildlife.
26. These other functions could as well be the subject of the extra meeting requiring the approval of Cabinet secretary. The inference made by the respondent would have been valid, if the role of the committees set up under section 18 were limited to verifying claims and making recommendations, only.
27. Further it is evident from section 7 of the Act that the setting up of the compensation committees is the work of the 1st respondent. One of the functions of the 1st respondent under section 7 is to set up County Wildlife Conservation Committee in respects of each county. (see Section 7 (c). It is the therefore evident that the committee established under section 18 is a creature of the 1st respondent, established pursuant to section 7(c)
28. Also , pursuant to regulation 15 of the 2017, the 1st respondent is responsible for the declaration of vacancies in any of the committees established, either at the first establishment of a committee of a particular county or whenever a vacancy arises. Further as correctly pointed out by the Applicant the respondent is responsible for payment of salaries and allowances for the committees set up under section 18, one of which is the 2nd respondent herein.
29. In view of the foregoing , am in agreement with the Applicant’s submissions that the 2nd respondent is an Agent of the 1st respondent , and consequently the 1st respondent is liable for the actions or failures of the 2nd respondent.
30. Finally , I have considered the supreme court decision in the case of Kenya Wildlife Service v Joseph Musyoki Kalonzo [2017] KECA 234 (KLR) where the court of Appeal held : ‘The appellant admits the duty to manage and conserve wildlife. That duty comes with the attendant responsibility to shoulder any claims of loss or damage caused by the breach of that duty’
31. On the various responsibilities of the respondents in the compensation process, the court in Joseph Musyoki’s case(supra) went on to state : The law on this point as succinctly pronounced in Joseph Boru Ngera & Another vs Kenya Wildlife Service vs Rift Valley Agricultural Contractors Limited [2014] eKLR among others is still good law on this point. The cabinet secretary referred to in the Act pays the money on behalf of the appellant. Neither the Court nor the parties should concern themselves with the internal arrangements of the appellant as to whether it is the CEO of the appellant or the cabinet secretary who should disburse the money. The Appellant in the cited case was the Respondent herein.
32. It is my finding therefore that in as far as the applicant’s claim has not been acted on, the respondents have failed in its statutory duty. Prayer one of the Application is therefore warranted.



33. Under prayer 2 of the application, the Applicant prays that the 1st respondent be compelled to report to this court on compliance with the orders that this court may issue. I need to point out that Regulation 29 of the Regulations sets out the timelines for compliance by the committee and the cabinet secretary. Consequently, once the 1st respondent complies with Order 1, then process should take a life of its own. In any case, in the event of default, the Applicant will have the liberty to seek the enforcement through the usual execution process. I do not therefore consider it necessary for this court to monitor the work of the respondents.

whether an order for compensation should be made.

34. The Applicant has asked this court to compel the respondent to make payment for a ksh. 2,000,000 set by the Act. That is not the work of this court, and as correctly submitted by the respondent, it is premature. The process must run through the entire process provided under section 25 of the Act. Further, the ksh. 2 million is the maximum payable under the Act and it is possible that once the assessment is done, the amount payable may fall below ksh. 2 million.

35. Nevertheless, any payment to be made is subject to an assessment by the 2nd Respondent. This court cannot usurp the work of the respondents which is clearly laid out under the Act.

36. The 1st respondent has brought up the issue of exhaustion principle, which principle, is also embodied in Section 9(2) of the FAAA It is argued that the applicant ought to exhaust the alternative mechanism under the statute.

37. However, the defence of exhaustion doctrine would be valid only if the process of deliberation had begun, or if the Applicant had not filed his claim with the respondents. For failure to deliberate and plan on the Applicant's claim when it had been submitted to them, the Applicant is entitled to an order of mandamus.

38. In the end , I hereby proceed to make orders as follows:

a). An order of mandamus is hereby issued directing the respondents to verify and make a determination of the ex-parte applicant's claim lodged on 28th July 2023 within 30 days of this order and thereafter, make payment, or convey the decision arrived at, to the exparte applicant, within 30 days following the said deliberation. .

b). The costs of the Application, assessed at ksh. 30,000 is awarded to the Applicant.

DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT ISIOLO THIS 27TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2025.

S. CHIRCHIR

JUDGE.

In the presence of :

Roba Katelo- Court Assistant.

Mr. Amule for the Applicant

Ms. Wanjiru for the 1st Respondent.

