



**REPUBLIC OF KENYA**

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI**

**JUDICIAL REVIEW APPLICATION NO. 196 OF 2014**

**REPUBLIC.....APPLICANT**

**VERSUS**

**THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE**

**LIVESTOCK & FISHERIES.....1<sup>ST</sup> RESPONDENT**

**THE HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL.....2<sup>ND</sup> RESPONDENT**

**EX PARTE: WINNIE WANDAI MUNIU**

**JUDGEMENT**

**Introduction**

1. By a Notice of Motion dated 5<sup>th</sup> August, 2014 the *ex parte* applicant herein, **Winnie Wandai Muniu**, seeks the following reliefs:

- 1. That an order of mandamus be and is hereby issued ordering the Respondents to pay to the Applicant the decretal amount of Kshs 534,809/= as at 27<sup>th</sup> June 2011 and taxed costs of 83,563/= as at 27<sup>th</sup> June 2011 together with interest at court rate from the 27<sup>th</sup> June 2011 until payment is full.**
- 2. An order directing the Respondents to pay to the Applicant costs of these proceedings and interest thereon at courts rates from the date of the ruling.**

**Applicant's Case**

2. According to the Applicant, he filed a civil suit in Limuru against the Hon. Attorney General and **Nicholas Muganda Mungai** being PMCC No. 271 of 2008 on 18<sup>th</sup> February 2009 in which he claimed both general and special damages for injuries he had sustained following a Traffic Road Accident when motor vehicle registration number KAW 804W, and GK R425 collided.

3. The said suit, in which the Hon. Attorney General duly entered a memorandum of appearance and filed a defence, it was averred, was duly tried and the learned Resident Magistrate delivered his judgment on 2<sup>nd</sup> November 2008 awarding the Applicant Kshs 496,150/= by way of general and special damages for injuries the Applicant had sustained as a result of the negligence of the servant and/or agent of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent. Consequently a decree and certificate of costs was issued followed by a certificate of order

against the Government.

4. According to the applicant, as at 27<sup>th</sup> June 2011 the decretal amount outstanding was Kshs 534,809/= which sum continues to accrue interest together with costs of Kshs 83,563/= amounting to Kshs 543,162/= which remain unpaid to date despite several reminders to the Respondents.

5. It was the applicant's case that the refusal and neglect by the Hon. Attorney General to pay the Applicant the sum of judgment and costs is illegal and is unfair to her in that it is denying her the right to enjoy the fruits of litigation and the Respondents are under obligation to satisfy judgment entered against the Respondents hence the orders sought in these proceedings.

6. These proceedings were not opposed hence the applicant's averments remained uncontroverted.

### **Determination**

7. I have considered the application, the verifying affidavit as well as the submissions file on behalf of the applicants.

8. It is not in doubt that section 21(4) of the **Government Proceedings Act** prohibits execution against the Government. The said provision states:

***Save as provided in this section, no execution or attachment or process in the nature thereof shall be issued out of any court for enforcing payment by the Government of any money or costs, and no person shall be individually liable under any order for the payment by the Government or any Government department, or any officer of the Government as such, of any money or costs.***

9. However section 21 (1) of the Act provides:

***“Where in any civil proceedings by or against the Government, or in proceedings in connection with any arbitration in which the Government is a party, any order (including an order for costs) is made by any court in favour of any person against the Government, or against a Government department, or against an officer of the Government as such, the proper officer of the court shall, on an application in that behalf made by or on behalf of that person at any time after the expiration of twenty-one days from the date of the order or, in case the order provides for the payment of costs and the costs require to be taxed, at any time after the costs have been taxed, whichever is the later, issue to that person a certificate in the prescribed form containing particulars of the order:***

***Provided that, if the court so directs, a separate certificate shall be issued with respect to the costs (if any) ordered to be paid to the applicant.”***

10. Section 21 (3) of the said Act on the other hand provides:

***“If the order provides for the payment of any money by way of damages or otherwise, or of any costs, the certificate shall state the amount so payable, and the Accounting Officer for the Government department concerned shall, subject as hereinafter provided, pay to the person entitled or to his advocate the amount appearing by the certificate to be due to him together with interest, if any, lawfully due thereon:***

***Provided that the court by which any such order as aforesaid is made or any court to which an appeal against the order lies may direct that, pending an appeal or otherwise, payment of the whole of any amount so payable, or any part thereof, shall be suspended, and if the certificate has not been issued may order any such direction to be inserted therein.”***

11. The effect of these provisions is that whereas execution proceedings as are known to law are not

available against the Government, the accounting officer for the Government department concerned is nevertheless under a statutory duty to satisfy a judgement made by the Court against that department. As was held by Lord Goddard C. J. in the English case of **R (Regina) vs. Dudsheath, ex parte, Meredith [1950] 2 ALL E.R. 741, at 743**, *Mandamus is neither a writ of course nor a writ of right, but will be granted if the duty is in the nature of a public duty, and specially affects the rights of an individual, provided there is no more appropriate remedy.* See also **Republic vs. Town Clerk, Kisumu Municipality, Ex Parte East African Engineering Consultants [2007] 2 EA 441**.

12. This procedure was dealt with extensively in **Shah vs. Attorney General (No. 3) Kampala HMC No. 31 of 1969 [1970] EA 543** where Goudie, J eloquently, in my view, expressed himself, which expression I fully associate myself with, *inter alia*, as follows:

**“Mandamus is essentially English in its origin and development and it is therefore logical that the court should look for an English definition. Mandamus is a prerogative order issued in certain cases to compel the performance of a duty. It issues from the Queen’s Bench Division of the English High Court where the injured party has a right to have anything done, and has no other specific means of compelling its performance, especially when the obligation arises out of the official status of the respondent. Thus it is used to compel public officers to perform duties imposed upon them by common law or by statute and is also applicable in certain cases when a duty is imposed by Act of Parliament for the benefit of an individual. Mandamus is neither a writ of course nor of right, but it will be granted if the duty is in the nature of a public duty and especially affects the rights of an individual, provided there is no more appropriate remedy. The person or authority to whom it is issued must be either under a statutory or legal duty to do or not to do something; the duty itself being of an imperative nature... In cases where there is a duty of a public or quasi-public nature, or a duty imposed by statute, in the fulfilment of which some other person has an interest the court has jurisdiction to grant *mandamus* to compel the fulfilment...The foregoing may also be thought to be much in point in relation to the applicant’s unsatisfied judgement which has been rendered valueless by the refusal of the Treasury Officer of Accounts to perform his statutory duty under section 20(3) of the Government Proceedings Act. It is perhaps hardly necessary to add that the applicant has very much of an interest in the fulfilment of that duty...Since *mandamus* originated and was developed under English law it seems reasonable to assume that when the legislature in Uganda applied it to Uganda they intended it to be governed by English law in so far as this was not inconsistent with Uganda law. Uganda, being a sovereign State, the Court is not bound by English law but the court considers the English decisions must be of strong persuasive weight and afford guidance in matters not covered by Uganda law...English authorities are overwhelmingly to the effect that no order can be made against the State as such or against a servant of the State when he is acting “simply in his capacity of servant”. There are no doubt cases where servants of the Crown have been constituted by Statute agents to do particular acts, and in these cases a *mandamus* would lie against them as individuals designated to do those acts. Therefore, where government officials have been constituted agents for carrying out particular duties in relation to subjects, whether by royal charter, statute, or common law, so that they are under a legal obligation towards those subjects, an order of *mandamus* will lie for the enforcement of the duties...With regard to the question whether *mandamus* will lie, that case falls within the class of cases when officials have a public duty to perform, and having refused to perform it, *mandamus* will lie on the application of a person interested to compel them to do so. It is no doubt difficult to draw the line, and some of the cases are not easy to reconcile... It seems to be an illogical argument that the Government Accounting Officer cannot be compelled to carry out a statutory duty specifically imposed by Parliament out of funds which Parliament itself has said in section 29(1) of the Government Proceedings Act shall be provided for the purpose. There is nothing in the said Act itself to suggest that this duty is owed solely to the Government...Whereas *mandamus* may be refused where there is another appropriate remedy, there is no discretion to withhold *mandamus* if no other remedy remains. When there is no specific remedy, the court will grant a *mandamus* that justice may be done. The construction of that sentence is this: where**

there is no specific remedy and by reason of the want of specific remedy justice cannot be done unless a *mandamus* is to go, then *mandamus* will go... In the present case it is conceded that if *mandamus* was refused, there was no other legal remedy open to the applicant. It was also admitted that there were no alternative instructions as to the manner in which, if at all, the Government proposed to satisfy the applicant's decree. It is sufficient for the duty to be owed to the public at large. The prosecutor of the writ of *mandamus* must be clothed with a clear legal right to something which is properly the subject of the writ, or a legal right by virtue of an Act of Parliament...In the court's view the granting of *mandamus* against the Government would not be to give any relief against the Government which could not have been obtained in proceedings against the Government contrary to section 15(2) of the Government Proceedings Act. What the applicant is seeking is not relief against the Government but to compel a Government official to do what the Government, through Parliament, has directed him to do. Likewise there is nothing in section 20(4) of the Act to prevent the making of such order. The subsection commences with the proviso "save as is provided in this section". The relief sought arises out of subsection (3), and is not "execution or attachment or process in the nature thereof". It is not sought to make any person "individually liable for any order for any payment" but merely to oblige a Government officer to pay, out of the funds provided by Parliament, a debt held to be due by the High Court, in accordance with a duty cast upon him by Parliament. The fact that the Treasury Officer of Accounts is not distinct from the State of which he is a servant does not necessarily mean that he cannot owe a duty to a subject as well as to the Government which he serves. Whereas it is true that he represents the Government, it does not follow that his duty is therefore confined to his Government employer. In *mandamus* cases it is recognised that when statutory duty is cast upon a Crown servant in his official capacity and the duty is owed not to the Crown but to the public any person having a sufficient legal interest in the performance of the duty may apply to the Courts for an order of *mandamus* to enforce it. Where a duty has been directly imposed by Statute for the benefit of the subject upon a Crown servant as *persona designata*, and the duty is to be wholly discharged by him in his official capacity, as distinct from his capacity as an adviser to or an instrument of the Crown, the Courts have shown readiness to grant applications for *mandamus* by persons who have a direct and substantial interest in securing the performance of the duty. It would be going too far to say that whenever a statutory duty is directly cast upon a Crown servant that duty is potentially enforceable by *mandamus* on the application of a member of the public for the context may indicate that the servant is to act purely as an adviser to or agent of the Crown, but the situations in which *mandamus* will not lie for this reason alone are comparatively few...*Mandamus* does not lie against a public officer as a matter of course. The courts are reluctant to direct a writ of *mandamus* against executive officers of a government unless some specific act or thing which the law requires to be done has been omitted. Courts should proceed with extreme caution for the granting of the writ which would result in the interference by the judicial department with the management of the executive department of the government. The Courts will not intervene to compel an action by an executive officer unless his duty to act is clearly established and plainly defined and the obligation to act is peremptory...On any reasonable interpretation of the duty of the Treasury Officer of Accounts under section 20(3) of the Act it cannot be argued that his duty is merely advisory, he is detailed as *persona designate* to act for the benefit of the subject rather than a mere agent of Government, his duty is clearly established and plainly defined, and the obligation to act is peremptory. It may be that they are answerable to the Crown but they are answerable to the subject...The court should take into account a wide variety of circumstances, including the exigency which calls for the exercise of its discretion, the consequences of granting it, and the nature and extent of the wrong or injury which could follow a refusal and it may be granted or refused depending on whether or not it promotes substantial justice... The issue of discretion depends largely on whether or not one should, or indeed can, look behind the judgement giving rise to the applicant's decree. Therefore an order of *mandamus* will issue as prayed with costs."

The Attorney General & Another ex parte James Alfred Koroso, I expressed myself as hereunder:

“...in the present case the ex parte applicant has no other option of realising the fruits of his judgement since he is barred from executing against the Government. Apart from *mandamus*, he has no option of ensuring that the judgement that he has been awarded is realised. Unless something is done he will forever be left baby sitting his barren decree. This state of affairs cannot be allowed to prevail under our current Constitutional dispensation in light of the provisions of Article 48 of the Constitution which enjoins the State to ensure access to justice for all persons. Access to justice cannot be said to have been ensured when persons in whose favour judgements have been decreed by courts of competent jurisdiction cannot enjoy the fruits of their judgement due to roadblocks placed on their paths by actions or inactions of public officers. Public offices, it must be remembered are held in trust for the people of Kenya and Public Officers must carry out their duties for the benefit of the people of the Republic of Kenya. To deny a citizen his/her lawful rights which have been decreed by a Court of competent jurisdiction is, in my view, unacceptable in a democratic society. Public officers must remember that under Article 129 of the Constitution executive authority derives from the people of Kenya and is to be exercised in accordance with the Constitution in a manner compatible with the principle of service to the people of Kenya, and for their well-being and benefit....The institution of judicial review proceedings in the nature of *mandamus* cannot be equated with execution proceedings. In seeking an order for *mandamus* the applicant is seeking, not relief against the Government, but to compel a Government official to do what the Government, through Parliament, has directed him to do. The relief sought is not “execution or attachment or process in the nature thereof”. It is not sought to make any person “individually liable for any order for any payment” but merely to oblige a Government officer to pay, out of the funds provided by Parliament, a debt held to be due by the High Court, in accordance with a duty cast upon him by Parliament. The fact that the Accounting Officer is not distinct from the State of which he is a servant does not necessarily mean that he cannot owe a duty to a subject as well as to the Government which he serves. Whereas it is true that he represents the Government, it does not follow that his duty is therefore confined to his Government employer. In *mandamus* cases it is recognised that when statutory duty is cast upon a Public Officer in his official capacity and the duty is owed not to the State but to the public any person having a sufficient legal interest in the performance of the duty may apply to the Courts for an order of *mandamus* to enforce it. In other words, *mandamus* is a remedy through which a public officer is compelled to do a duty imposed upon him by the law. It is in fact the State, the Republic, on whose behalf he undertakes his duties, that is compelling him, a servant, to do what he is under a duty, obliged to perform. Where therefore a public officer declines to perform the duty after the issuance of an order of *mandamus*, his/her action amounts to insubordination and contempt of Court hence an action may perfectly be commenced to have him cited for such. Such contempt proceedings are no longer execution proceedings but are meant to show the Court’s displeasure at the failure by a servant of the state to comply with the directive of the Court given at the instance of the Republic, the employer of the concerned public officer and to uphold the dignity and authority of the court.”

14. I also associate myself with the views expressed by Githua, J in Republic vs. Permanent Secretary Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security & Another ex parte Fredrick Manoah Egungza that:

“The only requirement which serves as a condition precedent to the satisfaction or enforcement of decrees for money issues against the Government is found in section 21(1) and (2) of the Government Proceedings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which provides that payment will be based on a certificate of costs obtained by the successful litigant from the court issuing the decree which should be served on the Hon. Attorney General. The certificate of order against the Government should be issued by the court after expiration of 21 days after entry of judgement. Once the certificate of order against the Government is served on the Hon. Attorney General, Section 21(3) imposes a statutory duty

**on the accounting officer to pay the sums specified in the said order to the person entitled or to his advocate together with any interest lawfully accruing thereon. This provision does not condition payment to budgetary allocation and parliamentary approval of Government expenditure in the financial year subsequent to which Government liability accrues. The Respondent's claim that the Applicant should have waited until the start of the next financial year to enforce payment of the decree issued in his favour cannot be sustained firstly because it has no legal basis and secondly because it is the responsibility of the Government to make contingency provisions for its liabilities in tort in each financial year so that successful litigants who obtain decrees against the Government are not left without remedy at any time of the year."**

15. I adopt reasoning in the said cases.

16. In the absence of any replying affidavit, this court finds merit in the Notice of Motion dated 5<sup>th</sup> August, 2014.

17. The circumstances under which judicial review order of *mandamus* are issued were set out by the Court of Appeal in **Republic vs. Kenya National Examinations Council ex parte Gathenji & Others Civil Appeal No. 266 of 1996** *inter alia* as follows:

**"The order of *mandamus* is of a most extensive remedial nature, and is, in form, a command issuing from the High Court of Justice, directed to any person, corporation or inferior tribunal, requiring him or them to do some particular thing therein specified which appertains to his or their office and is in the nature of a public duty. Its purpose is to remedy the defects of justice and accordingly it will issue, to the end that justice may be done, in all cases where there is a specific legal right or no specific legal remedy for enforcing that right; and it may issue in cases where, although there is an alternative legal remedy, yet that mode of redress is less convenient, beneficial and effectual...These principles mean that an order of *mandamus* compels the performance of a public duty which is imposed on a person or body of persons by a statute and where that person or body of persons has failed to perform the duty to the detriment of a party who has a legal right to expect the duty to be performed."**

18. Therefore as was appreciated in **Republic vs. Kenya National Examinations Council ex parte Gathenji & Others** (supra) there is a specific legal right but no specific legal remedy available for enforcing that right as execution cannot issue against the Government in the ordinary way. In such circumstances it is clear that an order of *mandamus* may go forth in order to remedy the defects of justice.

19. Therefore there is a duty imposed on the accounting officer in the Ministry of Agriculture Livestock and Fisheries, who is the Principal Secretary therein to settle the decree the subject these proceedings. As stated hereinabove, once the certificate of order against the Government is served on the Hon. Attorney General, Section 21(3) imposes a statutory duty on the accounting officer to pay the sums specified in the said order to the person entitled or to his advocate together with any interest lawfully accruing thereon. In this case the said certificate was duly issued and served.

20. I have however perused the decree exhibited herein and it is clear that contrary to the certificate of order against the Government in which the rate of interest is indicated 12% per annum, the rate of interest as per the decree is indicated as 8%.

21. As the Respondents are only liable to pay what is indicated in the decree, I hereby grant an order of *mandamus* directed to the Respondents compelling them to pay to the *Ex-parte* Applicant the sum of Kshs 496,150/= together with interest accrued thereon at the rate of 8% from 2<sup>nd</sup> November, 2010 as well as the costs assessed in the sum of Kshs 83,563.00.

22. As these proceedings were unopposed the applicant will have half the costs hereof.

23. It is so ordered.

**Dated at Nairobi this 3<sup>rd</sup> day of December, 2015**

**G V ODUNGA**

**JUDGE**

***Delivered in the absence of the parties.***

***Cc Muriuki***