Khushi Motors Limited & another v Momanyi (Civil Appeal E143 of 2023) [2025] KEHC 2968 (KLR) (6 March 2025) (Judgment)

Neutral citation: [2025] KEHC 2968 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT AT KISII

CIVIL APPEAL E143 OF 2023

DKN MAGARE, J

MARCH 6, 2025

BETWEEN

KHUSHI MOTORS LIMITED ..... 1ST APPELLANT

PHILIP M. MUCHEMI ..... 2ND APPELLANT

AND

JOSEPH MOMANYI ..... RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

1. This appeal arises from the Judgment and decree of subordinate court delivered by Hon. D.O. Mac'Andere (SRM) on 25.9.2023 in Kisii CMCC No. 468 of 2019.

2. The Appellants lodged the Memorandum of Appeal dated 27.11.2023. Although the grounds are listed as 13, they are circumlocutive, winding and repetitive. What is clear is that the grounds raised are that the learned magistrate erred in fact and law in her finding on liability and the award of general damages. Liability was awarded at 100% for the Respondent and Ksh. 600,000/= was awarded in general damages. The memorandum of appeal thus negates the provisions of Order 42 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which posits as doth: -

> " Every appeal to the High Court shall be in the form of a memorandum of appeal signed in the same manner as a pleading.
>
> (2) The memorandum of appeal shall set forth concisely and under distinct heads the grounds of objection to the decree or order appealed against, without any argument or narrative, and such grounds shall be numbered consecutively.

3. The Court of Appeal had this to say about compliance with Rule 86 of the Court of Appeal Rules (which is pari materia with Order 42 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules) in the case of Robinson Kiplagat Tuwei v Felix Kipchoge Limo Langat [2020] eKLR: -

> " We are yet again confronted with an appeal founded on a memorandum of appeal that is drawn in total disregard of rule 86 of the Court of Appeal Rules. That rule demands that a memorandum of appeal must set forth concisely, without argument or narrative, the grounds upon which a judgment is impugned. What we have before us are some 18 grounds of appeal that lack focus and are repetitively tedious. It is certainly not edifying for counsel to present two dozen grounds of appeal, and end up arguing only two or three issues, on the myth that he has condensed the grounds of appeal. This Court has repeatedly stated that counsel must take time to draw the memoranda of appeal in strict compliance with the rules of the Court. (See Abdi Ali Dere v. Firoz Hussein Tundal & 2 Others [2013] eKLR) and Nasri Ibrahim v. IEBC & 2 Others [2018] eKLR. In the latter case, this Court lamented:
>
> "We must reiterate that counsel must strive to make drafting of grounds of appeal an art, not an exercise in verbosity, repetition, or empty rhetoric...A surfeit of prolixious grounds of appeal do not in anyway enhance the chances of success of an appeal. If they achieve anything, it is only to obfuscate the real issues in dispute, vex and irritate the opposite parties, waste valuable judicial time, and increase costs." The 18 grounds of appeal presented by the appellant, Robinson Kiplagat Tuwei against the judgment of the Environment and Land Court at Eldoret (Odeny, J.) dated 19th September 2018 raise only two issues..."

4. In the Plaint dated 26.6.2019, the Respondent claimed damages for an accident pleaded to have occurred on 18.3.2019 within Kisii Township Road when the Respondent as pedestrian was hit by motor vehicle Registration Number KCN 540U owned by the 1st Appellant and driven by the 2nd Appellant. The Respondent set forth particulars of negligence and injuries and pleaded special damages. The injuries were pleaded as follows:

   i. Head injury with loss of consciousness

   ii. Bruises to the right wrist

   iii. Bruises to the left leg

   iv. Chest contusion

   v. Blunt trauma to the neck

   vi. Bruises to the right left ankle

   vii. Bruises to the front region

   viii. Left lower molar fracture

5. Special damages were also pleaded as follows:

   Medical report Ksh. 6,500/=

   Motor vehicle search Ksh.550/=

   Medical expenses Ksh. 1,440/=

6. The Appellants filed his defence dated 10.1.2020. They denied the particulars of negligence as pleaded by the Respondent and blamed the Respondent for the accident.

7. The lower court considered the matter and awarded reliefs as follows:Liability agreed at 100% for the RespondentSpecial damages Ksh. 7,870/=General damages Ksh. 600,000/=

Evidence

8. PW1 was the Respondent, Joseph Momanyi Nyakiba. He testified that he was injured on the head, hand and chest. He had not healed. He was at the main stage walking while heading home. He was walking carefully. He was hit at the edge of the road from behind.

    1. PW2 was Dr. Morebu Peter Momanyi. He confirmed the injuries by the Respondent. The injuries were 2 months old. The injuries were captured in the treatment notes.

10. PW3 was No. 59020 Corporal Paul Mulatia. He received a report of the accident and proceeded to the scene. The accident occurred between KCN 540U and the Respondent was among those injured. The motor vehicle lost brakes and hit pedestrians. On cross examination, he was not aware anyone was charged. The investigations blamed the matatu.

11. The 2nd Appellant did not call witnesses. By consent, the Appellants' medical report was produced in evidence.

Submissions

12. The Appellants submitted that they should not be held 100% liable for the accident. On damages, it was submitted that an award of Ksh. 600,000/= was inordinately high. The cases relied upon were however not recent.

13. On the other hand, the Respondent's submission was that the lower court was correct on both quantum and liability.

Analysis

14. This being a first appeal, this court is under a duty to re-evaluate and assess the evidence and make its own conclusions. It must, however, keep at the back of its mind that a subordinate court, unlike the appellate court, had the advantage of observing the demeanour of the witnesses and hearing their evidence first hand.

15. This Court will not interfere with the exercise of judicial discretion by an inferior court unless it is satisfied that its decision is clearly wrong. In the case of Mbogo and Another vs. Shah [1968] EA 93 the court stated:

> "...that this Court will not interfere with the exercise of judicial discretion by an inferior court unless it is satisfied that its decision is clearly wrong, because it has misdirected itself or because it has acted on matters on which is should not have acted or because it failed to take into consideration matters which it should have taken into consideration and in doing so arrived at a wrong conclusion."

16. The duty of the first appellate court was set out in the case of Selle and another Vs Associated Motor Board Company and Others [1968]EA 123, where the judges in their usual gusto, held as follows;-

> ".. this court is not bound necessarily to accept the findings of fact by the court below. An appeal to this court ... is by way of re-subordinate and the Court of Appeal is not bound to follow the subordinate Court's finding of fact if it appears either that he failed to take

account of particular circumstances or probabilities or if the impression of demeanour of a witness is inconsistent with the evidence generally."

17. The court is to bear in mind that it had neither seen nor heard the witnesses. It is the subordinate court that has observed the demeanor and truthfulness of those witnesses. However, documents still speak for themselves. The observation of documents is the same as the lower court as parties cannot read into those documents matters extrinsic to them.

18. This court's jurisdiction to review the evidence should be exercised with caution. In the cases of Peters vs Sunday Post Limited [1958] EA 424 , the court therein rendered itself as follows:-

> " It is a strong thing for an appellate court to differ from the findings on a question of fact, of the judge who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses...But the jurisdiction to review the evidence should be exercised with caution: it is not enough that the appellate court might have come to a different conclusion..."

19. This court does not have the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses as did the lower court, yet it must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions. In Selle & Another vs. Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & Others [1968] EA 123, this principle was enunciated thus:

> " ...this court is not bound necessarily to accept the findings of fact by the court below. An appeal to this court ... is by way of retrial and the principles upon which this court acts in such an appeal are well settled. Briefly put they are that this court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect..."

20. The Appellants urged the court to find that the lower court erred in finding 100% liability for the Respondent. The court is asked to establish whether the lower court erred in finding, on a balance of probabilities that the Appellants were jointly and severally 100% liable for the accident. The legal burden of proof lies upon the party who invokes the aid of the law and asserts an issue based thereon. In Anne Wambui Ndiritu –vs- Joseph Kiprono Ropkoi & Another [2005] 1 EA 334, the Court of Appeal held that:

> " As a general proposition under Section 107 (1) of the *Evidence Act*, Cap 80, the legal burden of proof lies upon the party who invokes the aid of the law and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue. There is however the evidential burden that is case upon any party the burden of proving any particular fact which he desires the court to believe in its existence which is captured in Sections 109 and 112 of the Act."

21. It follows that the initial burden of proof lies on the Plaintiffs, but the same may shift to the Defendant, depending on the circumstances of the case. In Evans Nyakwana –vs- Cleophas Bwana Ongaro [2015] eKLR it was held that:

> " As a general preposition the legal burden of proof lies upon the party who invokes the aid of the law and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue. That is the purport of Section 107 (i) of the *Evidence Act*, Chapter 80 Laws of Kenya. Furthermore, the evidential burden... is cast upon any party, the burden of proving any particular fact which he desires the court to believe in its existence. That is captured in Section 109 and 112 of law that proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person...The appellant did not discharge that burden and as

Section 108 of the *Evidence Act* provides the burden lies in that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given as either side."

22. The balance of probabilities is also about what is likely to have happened than the other. Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in Re H and Others (Minors) [1996] AC 563, 586 held that;

> " The balance of probability standard means that a court is satisfied an event occurred if the court considers that, on the evidence, the occurrence of the even was more likely than not. When assessing the probabilities the court will have in mind as a factor, to whatever extent is appropriated in the particular case, that the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred and, hence, the stronger should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation is established on the balance of probability....."

23. Furthermore, the standard of proof in civil cases must carry a reasonable degree of probability, but not so high as is required in a criminal case for such standard is based on a preponderance of probabilities. In Palace Investment Ltd –vs- Geoffrey Kariuki Mwenda & Another [2015] eKLR, the Judges of Appeal held that:

> " Denning J, in Miller –vs- Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372 discussing the burden of proof had this to say;-
>
> "That degree is well settled. It must carry a reasonable degree of probability, but not so high as is required in a criminal case. If the evidence is such that a tribunal can say: we think it more probable than not; the burden is discharged, but, if the probabilities are equal it is not.
>
> This, burden on a balance or preponderance of probabilities means a win however narrow. A draw is not enough. So, in any case in which the tribunal cannot decide one way or the other which evidence to accept where both parties...are equally (un) convincing, the party bearing the burden of proof will lose because the requisite standard will not have been attained."

24. The Respondent was a pedestrian and reliable evidence was that he was walking along the road with other pedestrians. PW3's evidence was that the accident motor vehicle herein, which was a matatu developed brake failure and hit pedestrians walking along the road including the Respondent. This testimony was not shaken in cross examination and this court has no reason not believing it.

25. The Appellants filed a defence but did not call the driver of the accident motor vehicle at the hearing. The evidence of the Respondent as to the occurrence of the accident was largely uncontroverted. In the case of Janet Kaphiphe Ouma & Another –vs- Maries Stopes International (Kenya), Kisumu HCCC No. 68 of 2007, Ali Aroni, J citing the decision in Edward Muriga suing through *Stanley Muriga –vs- Nathaniel D. Schulter, Civil Appeal No. 23 of 1997* it was held that:

> " In this matter, apart from filing its statement of defence the defendant did not adduce any evidence in support of assertions made therein. The evidence of the 1st plaintiff and that of the witness remain uncontroverted and the statement in the defence therefore remains mere allegations...Sections 107 and 108 of the *Evidence Act* are clear that he who asserts or pleads must support the same by way of evidence."
>
> 16. Guided by the above case, I find the statements in the defence filed on 10th December 2014 remain mere allegations having not been substantiated orally in court by the Appellant to controvert the Respondents testimony."

26. Therefore, the Appellant's defense in the lower court thus contained mere allegations that were not substantiated in evidence and I so find. However, even if there were no defence filed, the Respondent still retained the duty to prove his case on the balance of probabilities. The Court of Appeal's position in Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi –vs- Mwangi Stephen Muriithi & Another [2014] eKLR espouses the correct legal position that:

> " It is a firmly settled procedure that even where a defendant has not denied the claim by filing a defence or an affidavit or even where the defendant did not appear, formal proof proceedings are conducted. The claimant lays on the table evidence of facts contended against the defendant. And the trial court has a duty to examine that evidence to satisfy itself that indeed the claim has been proved. If the evidence falls short of the required standard of proof, the claim is and must be dismissed. The standard of proof in a civil case, on a balance of probabilities, does not change even in the absence of rebuttal by the other side."

27. Where the Respondent proved his case to the required standard, it was the duty of the Appellants to prove contributory negligence which in my view they failed. In the case of Mac Drugall App V Central Railroad Co. Rbr 63 Cal 431 the court held that; -

> " In an action to recover damages for a personal injury alleged to have been received through the negligence of the defendant, contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff is a matter of defence and it is an error to instruct the jury that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the injury occurred without such negligence".

28. The motor vehicle Registration No. KCN 540U could not have just caused the accident if well controlled and managed. As was held in Kenya Bus Services Ltd V Dina Kawira Humphrey Civil Appeal No. 295 of 2000 the Court of Appeal, per Tunoi, Omollo and Githinji JJA observed quite correctly that:

> " Buses, when properly maintained, properly serviced and properly driven do not just run over bridges and plunge into rivers without any explanation."

29. The above decision was also cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in Nairobi Civil Appeal No. 179 of 2003 - in Re Estate of Esther Wakiini Murage V Attorney General & 2 others [2015] eKLR where the Court of Appeal reiterated as doth: "Well driven motor vehicles do not just get involved in accidents....."

30. Therefore, I find no basis to disturb the finding of the learned magistrate on liability and hold that the Respondent proved want of care on the part of the driver of KCN 540U matatu. I am in consonance with the reasoning of the Court in the case of Mombasa Maize Millers & another v Elius Kinyua Gicovi [2021] eKLR where Nyakundi J referred to Wayne Ann Holdings Limited (T/a Superplus Food Stores) v Sandra Morgan, and held as follows:

> " In this case contributory negligence was raised as a defence. When such a defence [sic] is raised, it is only necessary for a defendant to show a want of care on the part of the claimant for his own safety in contributing to his injury. In Nance v British Columbia Electric Rly [1951] AC 601, at page 611, Lord Simon said:
>
> ".....When contributory negligence is set up as a defence, its existence does not depend on any duty owed by the injured party to the party sued, and all that is necessary to establish such a defence is to prove ... that the injured party did not in his own interest take

reasonable care of himself and contributed, by this want of care, to his own injury. For when contributory negligence is set up as a shield against the obligation to satisfy the whole of the plaintiff's claim the principle involved is that, where a man is part author of his own injury, he cannot call on the other party to compensate him in full."

31. The court finds no basis for interfering with the liability at 100% against the Appellants. I dismiss the appeal on this head.

32. On quantum, the lower court awarded Kshs. 600,000/= in general damages. This court has to reassess the effect of the injuries on the Respondent. The injuries were pleaded as follows:

    i. Head injury with loss of consciousness

    ii. Bruises to the right wrist

    iii. Bruises to the left leg

    iv. Chest contusion

    v. Blunt trauma to the neck

    vi. Bruises to the right left ankle

    vii. Bruises to the front region

    viii. Left lower molar fracture

33. In my reevaluation, I have no reason to doubt the evidence of the medical doctors obtained in the medical reports produced in court. They were not divergent in the injuries that the Respondent suffered. Except for the lower molar fracture, they agreed that the Respondent suffered the pleaded injuries.

34. This Court appreciates that Courts have impressively expressed the extent of application of an expert opinion in judicial proceedings and the general trend is that such evidence is not necessarily conclusive and binding. As was held in Shah and Another vs. Shah and Others [2003] 1 EA 290:

> " The opinion of the expert witness is not binding on the court, but is considered together with other relevant facts in reaching a final decision in the case and the court is not bound to accept the evidence of an expert if it finds good reasons for not doing so."

35. Further, the Court of Appeal, on its part in Kimatu Mbuvi T/A Kimatu Mbuvi & Bros vs. Augustine Munyao Kioko Civil Appeal No. 203 of 2001 [2007] 1 EA 139 held that:

> " ... such opinions are not binding on the Court although they will be given proper respect, particularly where there is no contrary opinion and the expert is properly qualified although a Court is perfectly entitled to reject the opinion if upon consideration alongside all other available evidence there is proper and cogent basis for doing so."

36. Furthermore, in Parvin Singh Dhalay vs. Republic [1997] eKLR; [1995-1998] 1 EA 29, it was held that:

> " It is now trite law that while the courts must give proper respect to the opinions of experts, such opinions are not, as it were, binding on the courts and the courts must accept them. Such evidence must be considered along with all other available evidence and if there is proper and cogent basis for rejecting the expert opinion, a court would be perfectly entitled

to do so. We will repeat what this Court said in the case of Elizabeth Kamene Ndolo vs. George Matata Ndolo, Civil Appeal No. 128 of 1995. There the Court said with regard to the evidence of experts:-

"The evidence of PW1 and the report of Munga were, we agree, entitled to proper and careful consideration, the evidence being that of experts but as has been repeatedly held the evidence of experts must be considered along with all other available evidence and it is still the duty of the trial court to decide whether or not it believes the expert and give reasons for its decision. A court cannot simply say:- "Because this is the evidence of an expert, I believe it."

37. Based on the above authorities, I am persuaded that the Respondent did not prove lower molar fracture, like found the Appellant's doctor in the medical report dated 17.1.2022. Indeed there was no mention of lower molar fracture treatment in the treatment notes produced by the Respondent. PW2, the Respondent's medical doctor alluded to the injuries as derived from the treatment notes. In his testimony, the Respondent did not refer to a broken lower molar as one of the injured body parts.

38. However, this court has to establish, for the award of damages, similar fact scenarios though bearing in mind that no two cases are precisely the same and that it is inevitable that there will be disparity in awards made by different courts for similar injuries as established in Southern Engineering Company Ltd. vs. Musingi Mutia Civil Appeal No 46 of 1983 [1985] eKLR. The Court of Appeal in Odinga Jacktone Ouma V Moureen Achieng Odera [2016] eKLR stated that "comparable injuries should attract comparable awards"

39. The principle on the award of damages is settled. In Charles Oriwo Odeyo vs. Appollo Justus Andabwa & Another [2017] eKLR the court set out the principles which guide the court in the assessment of damages in a personal injury case. The considerations include but not limited to; -

1) An award of damages is not meant to enrich the victim but to compensate such victim for the injuries sustained.

2) The award should be commensurable with the injuries sustained.

3) Previous awards in similar injuries sustained are mere guide but each case be treated on its own facts.

4) Previous awards to be taken into account to maintain stability of awards but factors such as inflation should be taken into account.

5) The awards should not be inordinately low or high.

40. Circumstances in which an Appellate court will interfere with the quantum of damages awarded by a trial court were clearly laid out in the case of Kenya Bus Services Limited vs. Jane Karambu Gituma Civil Appeal Case No. 241 of 2000 where the Court of Appeal stated as follows:

" ...in this regard, both the East African Court of Appeal (the predecessor of this Court) and this court itself have consistently maintained that an appellate court will not interfere with the quantum of damages awarded by a trial court unless it is satisfied either that the trial court acted on a wrong principle of law (as by taking into account some irrelevant factor or leaving out of account of some relevant one or adopting the wrong approach), or it has misapprehended the facts, or for those or any other reasons the award was so inordinately high or low so as to represent a wholly erroneous estimate of the damages."

41. The Court of Appeal pronounced itself succinctly on the principles of disturbing awards of damages in Kemfro Africa Limited t/a "Meru Express Services (1976)" & another v Lubia & another (No 2) [1985] eKLR as follows:

> The principles to be observed by an appellate court in deciding whether it is justified in disturbing the quantum of damages awarded by a trial Judge were held by the former Court of Appeal of Eastern Africa to be that it must be satisfied that either that the Judge, in assessing the damages, took into account an irrelevant factor, or left out of account a relevant one, or that, short of this, the amount is so inordinately low or so inordinately high that it must be a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage.

42. The foregoing statement had been ably elucidated by Sir Kenneth O'Connor P, in restating the Common Law Principles earlier enunciated in the case at the Privy Council, that is, Nance v British Columbia Electric Co Ltd, in the decision of Henry Hilanga v Manyoka 1961, 705, 713 at paragraph c, where the learned Judge ably pronounced himself as doth regarding disturbing quantum of damages:-

> 'The principles which apply under this head are not in doubt. Whether the assessment of damages be by the Judge or Jury, the Appellate Court is not justified in substituting a figure of its own for that awarded simply because it would have awarded a different figure if it had tried the case at the first instance.'
>
> We find the words of Lord Denning in the West (H) & Son Ltd (1964) A.C. 326 at page 341 on excessive awards on damages important to replicate herein thus:
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> "I may add, too, that if these sums get too large, we are in danger of injuring the body politic, just as medical malpractice cases have done in the United States of America. As large sums are awarded, premiums for insurance rise higher and higher, and they are passed to the public in the shape of higher and higher fees for medical attention. By contrast we have a National Health Service. But the health authorities cannot stand huge sums without impending their service to the community. The funds available come out of the pockets of the taxpayers. They have to be carefully husbanded and spent on essential services. They should not be dissipated in paying more than fair compensation."

43. The words of Lord Denning were reiterated by Nyarangi, JA. in Kigaragari v Aya [1985] eKLR thus:

> " I would express firmly the opinion that awards made in this type of cases or in any other similar ones must be seen not only to be within the limits set by decided cases but also to be within what Kenya can afford. That must bear heavily upon the court. The largest application should be given to that approach. As large amounts are awarded, they are passed on to members of the public, the vast majority of whom cannot just afford the burden, in the form of increased costs for insurance cover (in the case of accident cases) or increased fees."

44. Further, in the case of Kilda Osbourne v George Barned and Metropolitan Management Transport Holdings Ltd & another Claim No. 2005 HCV 294 being guided by the principles enunciated by both Lord Morris and Lord Devlin in H. West & Sons Ltd v Shephard {1963} 2 ALL ER 625 Sykes J stated as follows:

> " The principles are that assessment of damages in personal injury cases has objective and subjective elements which must be taken into account. The actual injury suffered is the objective part of the assessment. The awareness of the claimant and the knowledge that he or she will have to live with this injury for quite sometime is part of the subjective portion of

the assessment. The interaction between the subjective and the objective elements in light of other awards for similar injuries determines the actual award made to a particular claimant."

45. It is common reasoning that astronomical awards may lead to increased insurance premiums thus hurting the insurance industry as well as the economy. See the case of H. West and Son Ltd v. Shepherd [1964] AC.326 (supra) where it was stated that:

> " ...but money cannot renew a physical frame that has been battered and shattered. All that judges and courts can do is to award sums which must be regarded as giving reasonable compensation.
>
> In the process there must be the endeavour to secure some uniformity in the general method of approach. By common consent awards must be reasonable and must be assessed with moderation. Furthermore, it is eminently desirable that so far as possible comparable injuries should be compensated by comparable awards. When all this is said it still must be that amounts which are awarded are to a considerable extent conventional....."

46. With the above guide, if the award is inordinately high, then I will have to set it aside. If, however, it is just high but not inordinately high, I will not do so. For the appellate court to interfere with the award, it is not enough to show that the award is high or had I handled the case in the subordinate court I would have awarded a different figure.

47. I thereof proceed to determine similar fact cases in relation to damages as applicable this appeal. In Musembi & another v Mwai (Civil Appeal E001 of 2024) [2024] KEHC 8740 (KLR) (22 July 2024) (Judgment) the court (Onyiengo, J) reduced an award of Ksh.700,000/= by the lower court to Ksh. 500,000/= for the Plaintiff who suffered the following injuries:

    i. Blunt head injury

    ii. Traumatic brain injury.

    iii. Blunt chest injury.

    iv. Degloving injury/wound on the left forearm.

    v. Massive soft tissue with complete damage of left forearm muscles.

48. Similarly, in the case of H. Young Construction Company Ltd vs Richard Kyule Ndolo [2014] eKLR the court awarded a sum of Kshs. 250,000/= for degloving injury to the left leg with loss of skin over the calf muscles and blunt injury to the left ankle joint.

49. In the case of Francis Ndung'u Wambui & 2 others v Purity Wangui Gichobo (2019) eKRL the court of appeal reduced an award of Kshs. 450,00/= to Kshs. 250,000/= for injuries involving deep laceration on the medial side of the left leg and degloving injury on the left thumb.

50. In my view, the injuries suffered by the Respondent in the appeal herein are largely similar to Musembi & another v Mwai (supra) involving multiple soft tissue injuries besides a head injury. However, the injuries herein are slightly less severe bearing in mind that in the latter case, there was brain injury. Herein, no evidence was produced to support a fractured molar. Therefore, I am guided that the award of Kshs. 600,000/= granted by the lower court was inordinately high and I interfere with it. The injuries were multiple soft tissue injuries to which an award of Ksh. 350,000/= is adequate compensation, I award the same.

51. On special damages, the pleadings and evidence show that the Appellant pleaded and proved the amount that the lower court granted. The Appellants did not appeal the manner in which this award was not justified. The net effect of the foregoing is that the appeal on liability fails in toto and the appeal on quantum succeeds. As the appeal partially succeeds, I make no order as to costs.

Determination

52. In the upshot, I make the following orders:

    a. The appeal on liability is dismissed.

    b. The award of Ksh. 600,000/= in general damages is set aside and substituted with Ksh. 350,000/=.

    c. Each party will bear their own costs in the appeal.

    d. 30 days stay of execution.

    e. Right of appeal 14 days.

    f. The file is closed.

DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED AT NYERI ON THIS 6TH DAY OF MARCH, 2025. Judgment delivered through Microsoft Teams Online Platform.

KIZITO MAGARE

JUDGE

In the presence of: -

Ms. Munji for the Appellant

No appearance for the Respondent

Court Assistant – Michael