



REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

CIVIL CASE 881 OF 1991

KENNETH R. MWANGI..... PLAINTIFF

-VERSUS-

PIONEER GENERAL ASSURANCE..... DEFENDANT

JUDGEMENT

By this suit dated 20th February, 1991, the plaintiff, a businessman, prays for an injunction and an order that he has fully repaid a loan advanced to him by the defendant, an insurance company. The defendant however contends that the plaintiff still owes it some money.

In his amended plaint filed with the leave of the court on 16th May, 1991, the plaintiff alleges that at all material times he was the registered owner of a plot known as L.R. No. 36/1/947, Nairobi on which there is a residential building. By a charge executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant on the suit premises, the defendant had agreed to lend to the plaintiff the sum of Shs. 165,000/- repayable by monthly installments of shs.5, 301.25 inclusive of capital, insurance and interest with effect from 5th June, 1979 and that the charge, which was to act as security, for the amount borrowed, was subject to the provisions of the Registered Land Act, Cap.300 of the Laws of Kenya. In pursuance to the terms of the charge, he commenced making payment as therein stated in 1979 through a Banker's Order of Shs.5, 301.25 in favour of the defendant. In breach of the terms thereof, the defendant did not advance the sum of shs. 165,000/- as agreed. The defendant also, in breach of the terms of S.74(1) of the Registered Land Act, failed to notify the plaintiff of the breach before attempting to sell off the suit premises nor had they ever notified him of any breach or failure to pay any of the installments and had now advertised the suit premises for sale allegedly in exercise of the mortgagee's powers of sale. He also contended that the defendant had not accounted for shs.150, 000/- due to him under an endowment policy entered into at the time he was negotiating the loan from the defendant.

Consequently, the defendant should be restrained from selling the suit premises and be required to produce accounts. Plaintiff also prayed for a declaration that the loan had been fully paid and that the proceeds of the Life Policy should be paid to him plus general damages and costs of the suit. On its part the defendant contended that the charge was for Shs. 165,000/-; it was under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and not the Registered Land Act and that the default of payment was not denied and the plaintiff had admitted by an affidavit receipt of the demand notice. It also contended that the plaintiff had made only 1 payment towards the endowment policy and has since lapsed. Consequently, the suit should be dismissed. No counter-claim was pleaded by the defendant. The parties testified in support of their respective cases. The plaintiff testified that he had dealings with the defendant before the current matter. He had in 1972 been granted a loan by the defendant which he had successfully paid. In 1979, he needed some funds

to construct a house on plot No.36/1/947, Eastleigh registered in his name. As he was known to the defendant, he approached it for a loan of shs. 165,000/- to be secured by a charge on the said property. After the defendant had agreed to make the loan to him, he charged the plot to the defendant and signed a loan agreement which was to be repaid by monthly installments of shs.4, 000/- per month for 48 months at an interest of 12% per annum. As it was a loan for construction, its various amounts were to be paid as when certificates were produced.

After the construction work had started, the first installment of the money was paid to the contractor on his behalf on the production of the first certificate by the contractor on certification of the architect. After the first payment, no further payment was made either to him or the contractor by the defendant. According to him, no payment could be made by the defendant to his contractor or himself without a certificate. Although the second certificate was for Shs.56,000/-, this amount was not paid to him or his contractor as a dispute arose between him and the defendant as the defendant had decided that payments toward the certificates be by voucher, which he did not agree with. In the end the amount paid to him and his contractor was less than the amount for the first certificate. Without resolving the dispute on the 1st and 2nd certificate, the defendant also caused a third certificate to be made showing that he had received Shs.115,000/- and that he was receiving Shs.25,000/- for the third certificate. He denied having received the payments shown in the second certificate and was not paid on the third certificate and was unable to complete the construction work and no completion certificate had been issued by the contractor. As a result of the non-payment, he wrote complaining to the defendant on 9th August, 1979 and 12th June, 1980. In the letter of 9th August he particularly complained that he had not received any part of the third certificate while the letter of 12th June, 1980 cancelled policies and further payments and calling for an account. Although at best, the plaintiff appears to have received only shs.65,000/- he had to pay shs. 165,000/- directly in addition to payments under standing order force until June, 1984. In his view he had fully repaid the loan. According to the defendant, the sum which was to be advanced was Shs. 165,000/- at 12% per annum but to be disbursed in installments. It was to be drawn down within 3 months and repaid over 48 months. The first installment of Shs.65, 000/- was fully paid and acknowledged while the second sum of shs.50, 000/- was fully paid making a total of shs.115, 000/-. In the third installment only shs.5,000/- was paid making a total of shs. 120,000/- leaving the balance of shs.45, 000/- which were debited towards agreed deductions. It was also stated that the policy had lapsed for non-payment. By December, 1995, according to the defendant, the sum of shs.806,494/90 was due to it by the plaintiff. No evidence was adduced by the defendant that it was a licenced money lender nor was there evidence that it was entitled to charge more interest. In the plaintiff's view, it would be a breach of the agreement if the rate of interest was increased over and above the figure agreed.

Counsel for the parties made detailed submissions. Mr. Ibrahim, for the plaintiff, conceded that the first issues framed were too wide as they sought the court's determination on whether the suit disclosed any or any reasonable cause of action. In his view, the suit disclosed the issue on as to whether the loan was advanced, paid and/or whether the interest had been properly applied so as to arrive at the amount due. To support this contention, he relied heavily on the interlocutory ruling granting an injunction. In his view, the respondent, who has the custody of the accounts had failed to show the amount advanced and how it was worked out until the date of the intended sale of the plaintiff's suit premises. As a result, the amount due was as ambiguous as at the time of the injunction.

On the other hand, Mr. Okwach submitted that the sum of shs.165, 000/- was disbursed to or on behalf of the plaintiff which had not been fully repaid. According to him a total sum of shs. 165,000/- was paid on 4th May, 1979, 7th June, 1979 and 1st October, 1979 and the deductions therefrom were authorized by the charge which included the right to deduct therefrom the premiums for the life and fire policy and they lapsed when the plaintiff failed to make remittances to the defendant of loan repayments. Consequently, the plaintiff had breached his agreement with the defendant and now owed the defendant as in the counter claim.

The first issue for determination is in my view the terms of the loan agreement. On my reading of the charge, the loan secured was shs.165, 000/- to be paid to the plaintiff from time to time and to enable him to construct a house. It was to be advanced from time to time by installments as required with interest at the

rate of 12% on so much of the aforesaid sum as shall have been advanced to the borrower (the plaintiff) with yearly rests.

Was any money advanced and if so how much? As can be discerned from the evidence and exhibits, the mortgage was entered into on 23rd April, 1979 for construction of a building on the plaintiff's land known as LR No. 36/1/947 registered as I.R. No. 27604/1 under the Registration of Titles Act. The advance was to be up to the maximum of shs.165, 000/- plus rates, rents, taxes in respect of the suit premises if paid by defendant on behalf of the plaintiff. Purporting to be acting as above it is the plaintiff's case that after he paid off another loan from the defendant in 1972, he requested for the current loan repayable aforesaid. He had received payment as follows:

1. Certificate No. 1 of 9.5.79 for shs.65, 000/- deducted for expenses.
2. Certificate No. 2 of 6.6.79 for shs.50, 000/- not received though recommended.
3. Certificate No.3 of 26th July, 1979 for shs.25, 000/- not received though recommended.

. When the sum of the third certificate was also not received by the plaintiff, he raised a complaint on 9th August, 1979 and cancelled policies on 12th June, 1990. The only admitted sum is therefore shs.65, 000/-. In repayment of the above, according to the plaintiff, he repaid as follows:

1990:

12-7-1990 -shs.100, 000/-by cheque

18-10-1990 -shs. 10,000/- cash

20-11-1990 -shs. 10,000/-cash

31-12-1990 -Shs. 10,000/-cash

1991:

23-1-1991 -shs. 10,000/- cash

11-1-1991 -shs. 10,000/- cash

19-2-1991 -shs. 10,000/- cash

Total - shs. 160,000/-

According to the plaintiff amount due should have therefore been as follows:-

A - Amount advanced - shs.65,000/-

B- Interest at 12% per annum for 1980 to 1990 - kshs.7,800/-

- Kshs.72, 800 Amount overpaid shs.160, 000/- - kshs.72,800/- = Kshs.87,200/- On the other hand, the amount due as per the defendant consisted of shs. 165,000/- advanced as at the end of 1979. There is however no evidence of full payment of the said amount and at best only part of the money was advanced after several deductions were made there from. The deductions could have only been justified if so provided in the mortgage agreement. There was also a life policy. According to the plaintiff it had matured and was entitled to payment. On the other hand it is contended by the defendant that it had expired and had lapsed due to non-payment of premiums.

Counsel for the plaintiff canvassed the issue of general damages, in the event the court finds breach of the terms of the charge. In arriving at a figure of shs. 2,000,000/- he submitted that as a result of the breach of the terms, the plaintiff had had to use over shs. 250,000/- to complete the work. The learned counsel for the defendant has however contended that no breach had been committed by the defendant and as such no damages were payable.

The prayers sought by the plaintiff in the plaint dated 20th February, 1991 were as follows:

(a) An injunction to restrain the defendant servants and/or agents from selling or in any other way disposing of the plaintiff's property known as LR No. 36/1/947 on the 21st day of February, 1991 or any other day pending further orders from this honourable court.

(b) An order for production by the defendant of all statements of accounts books and records concerning the aforesaid charge.

(bb1) A declaration that the plaintiff has met his obligations to the defendant company in respect to the charge over L.R. No. 36/1/947 Nairobi and thus this honourable court do and hereby order the defendant to release the title document in respect to ALL THAT property known as L.R. No. 36/1/947 Nairobi to the Plaintiff.

(bb2) the defendant do remit to the plaintiff all benefits accrued on Life Endowment Assurance Policy No. 49/4276, quantum whereof to be assessed by the court.

(bb3) General damages for breach of contract thereof to be determined by the court.

(c) Costs of the suit "Prior to the hearing date, the issues which were agreed by the parties or approved by the court on 5th December, 1991 were as follows:" 1. Does the suit disclose a cause of action?

2. Was the charge executed subject to the provisions

Of the Registered Land Act or to Transfer of Property Act, 1882:

3. Did the policy lapse as alleged in the defence?

4. Was the defendant under any Statutory obligation to notify the plaintiff of any default in payment before selling the charged property?"

The amended plaint relied upon alleged inter alia that the plaintiff had executed a charge in favour of the defendant for shs. 165,000/- repayable by monthly installments of shs. 5,301/25 per month inclusive of insurance premiums as from 5th June, 1979 under the provisions of the Registered Land Act Cap. 300 of the Laws of Kenya

plaintiff commenced payments as from 1979 through bankers orders although the defendant had breached the terms of the charge of 23rd April, 1991 by making deductions there from and refusing to advance the agreed sum of shs. 165,000; was not notified of default before putting the property on sale; and that he held a life policy with the defendant worth 150,000/- with the defendant. The defendant however contended that the charge was under Transfer of Property Act, 1882 that there had been a default by the plaintiff that notice had been given before the attempted sale and that the plaintiff had not paid the premiums and the policy had therefore lapsed. In law where one enters into a specific contract, the parties are expected to perform the terms thereof to the letter unless the contract specifically provides to the contrary or unless the parties discharge each other from the obligations there under. In HCCC No. 1301 of 1995 Kenya National Capital Corporation Vs. Thammo Holding Limited and 3 others, after considering a number of common law authorities, Bhahdari J. held that as the plaintiff breached a material condition in the agreement of guarantee of ensuring that all directors had signed the documents or agreement of guarantee, thereby it discharged those who had signed from liability under the specific agreements or

guarantee.

The court was also referred to the cases of Kenya Commercial Bank Limited Vs. James Oisebe (1982-88) 1 KAR 48, Cuckmere Brick Co. Ltd and Another Vs. Mutual Finance Ltd. (1971) 1 All E.A. 633, Reid Vs. National Commercial Bank (1971) E.A. 525 and Harilal and Co. Vs. Standard Bank Ltd. (1967) EA. 512 in which the courts held that a breach of a fundamental term of an agreement discharged the innocent party from the effects of the agreement. When the current mortgage was made, the parties intended that the funds advanced would all be applied to construction work. In the recital which shows the property as being held under the Registration of Titles Act and is actually L.R. No. 36/1/947 not 1947, the sum of shs. 165,000/- to be advanced was to enable the plaintiff to complete the construction of a building with interest at 12% on the amount advanced and expenses with yearly rests in 48 monthly installments. The agreement or mortgage did not provide that the money to be advanced could be used to discharge other plaintiffs' liabilities save that the defendant could pay expenses on behalf of the plaintiff and claim same from the plaintiff if any. In breach of the clear intention of the mortgage, the defendant advanced only a portion of the agreed sum and proceeded to apply the balance to expenses of its nominated architect and others including insurance premiums. This was therefore a clear breach of the terms of the mortgage agreement and the court's answer to the first issue is that this suit discloses a cause of action. As already stated, the property was held under the Registration of Titles Act to which Indian Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies and the defendant was entitled to notice, which he was duly served with. This answers issue No. 2 and 4 leaving the 3rd issue only.

Issue No. 3 relates to the Endowment Assurance Policy taken out by the plaintiff with the defendant. The plaintiff did not produce any evidence of payment of even a single premium. According to the defendant however only one premium was credited to the policy, presumably from the proceeds of the intended loan and that the same had lapsed immediately. As policies must be paid for, there is no reason for me to find otherwise. I therefore hold that the policy lapsed and the plaintiff is not entitled to payment in respect thereof. The parties did not have any issue relating to damages. The amended plaint however sought damages for breach of contract. It is however observed that soon after the agreement was entered into, the terms were breached and in law he was thereby discharged therefrom. There is also no documentary evidence that he spent any money on the construction by reason of the breach of the agreement by the defendant. I am therefore unable to quantify the loss if any suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's failure to make payments as agreed in the mortgage.

There is some evidence that some payments were made to the defendant. There is however no specific pleadings for its return nor a prayer for same. As special damages must be pleaded and proved, I am unable to make any award in that regard. As already stated, the defendant breached the terms of the mortgage by not making payment as agreed. The plaintiff was therefore discharged from the terms of the mortgage. I therefore enter judgement for the plaintiff against the defendant as prayed in prayers (a) (b) and (bb1) of the amended plaint. Prayers (bb2) and (bb3) are hereby dismissed. The interest in the statement of account to be calculated at 12% after allowing for payments. I dismiss the counterclaim made by the plaintiff. As the plaintiff has substantively succeeded in this suit, I award the costs of the suit to the plaintiff. Orders accordingly.

Dated and delivered this 1st day of July, 2003.

G.P. Mbiti

JUDGE