



**IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA**

**AT NAKURU**

**CIVIL CASE NO.205 OF 2010**

**JOHNSON MACHINI MARITA.....1<sup>ST</sup>**  
**APPLICANTS/PLAINTIFF**  
**PHILIP ONDIEKI NYABOGA.....2<sup>ND</sup>**  
**APPLICANT/PLAINTIFF**

**VERSUS**

**PATRICK CHEGE GATHUKIA.....1<sup>ST</sup>**  
**RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT**  
**LUCY NJUHI GATHUKIA.....2<sup>ND</sup>**  
**RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT**  
**STEPHEN NGARI KIMARU.....3<sup>RD</sup>**  
**RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT**  
**MARY WANJIKU KOGL.....4<sup>TH</sup>**  
**RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT**  
**MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF NAKURU.....5<sup>TH</sup>**  
**RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT**  
**NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION.....6<sup>TH</sup>**  
**RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT**

**RULING**

The two applicants, one being administrator of the estate of the late Scholastica Masitsa Machini (the deceased) and the other a purchaser of the deceased person's parcel of land (plots A283 Race Track) respectively, have brought the present motion dated 26<sup>th</sup> January, 2011 for a temporary injunction to restrain the respondents from building, developing, evicting or trespassing on the said plot No.A283 Race Track now registered as NAKURU MUNICIPALITY BLOCK 1/1435, pending the hearing and determination of this suit.

It is the 2<sup>nd</sup> applicant's contention that the suit property was allotted to the deceased by the Municipal Council of Nakuru (the 5<sup>th</sup> respondent); that the deceased met all the conditions of allotment and was issued with a clearance certificate; that the 2<sup>nd</sup> applicant subsequently purchased the property from the deceased; that later, he learnt that the property had been sold to the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> respondents by the 4<sup>th</sup> respondent without any colour of right; that the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> respondents further purported to sell the property to the 3<sup>rd</sup> respondent; that the applicants' interest in the property notwithstanding, the 3<sup>rd</sup> respondent has began to construct on the suit property hence this action.

The respondents have filed statements of defence, replying affidavits and grounds of opposition, the

combined effect of which is that indeed plot No. A283 was originally allocated to one Macharia K. Nguire, who could not be traced and consequently the plot was allocated to the deceased; that the deceased having failed to fully fulfill the conditions of the allotment, the 5<sup>th</sup> respondent was at liberty to allot the property to the 4<sup>th</sup> respondent who equally had the right to dispose it to the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> respondents, who on the other hand sold the property to the 3<sup>rd</sup> respondent, that the 3<sup>rd</sup> respondent has a certificate of lease in his favour.

I have considered these rival arguments and the authorities cited by counsel representing the parties in this matter. Being an application for interlocutory injunction, the applicant must show not only that he has a *prima facie* case with a probability of success upon trial, but also, that unless he is granted an injunction, he will suffer such damage or injury unlikely to be compensated in damages. Where the court entertains a doubt in either of the above principles, it is required to consider whether the balance of convenience will favour the grant or refusal of the injunction. See **Giella Vs. Cassman Brown and Company Limited** (1973) EA 358.

The applicants will have to prove at the trial that they have the right over the plot in question, or conversely that the 3<sup>rd</sup> respondent's title was unlawfully obtained. No doubt the deceased was granted a conditional letter of allotment on 15<sup>th</sup> June, 1988. It is also not in dispute that she sold to the 2<sup>nd</sup> applicant the plot on 6<sup>th</sup> May, 1996. She died on 2<sup>nd</sup> January, 1999. I suppose because of her death, there was default in the payment of some charges on the plot, prompting the National Housing Corporation (the 6<sup>th</sup> respondent) to address a letter to her on 23<sup>rd</sup> June, 2008 and issue a newspaper publication on 31<sup>st</sup> July, 2008 calling upon defaulters, including the deceased, to settle the outstanding arrears.

It would appear that the arrears were settled as the 6<sup>th</sup> respondent wrote to the clerk to the 5<sup>th</sup> respondent confirming settlement of infrastructure loan for the suit plot. As all these were happening, the plot had been allotted to the 4<sup>th</sup> respondent in 2003 and a certificate of lease issued to her. In 2009, the plot was transferred to the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> respondents and another certificate of lease issued to them.

Finally on 7<sup>th</sup> July, 2010 following a transfer to the 3<sup>rd</sup> respondent, the present certificate of lease was issued in favour of the 3<sup>rd</sup> respondent. Without going into the merit of the applicants' claim, it is clear that although the deceased had a letter of allotment, she did not proceed as the letter advised, namely to obtain the lease documents and to make the requisite payments within a specific period.

In the case of **Caneland Limited Vs. The Commissioner of Lands & 5 others**, Civil Application No. NAI.311 of 1998, the Court of Appeal stated in circumstances similar to those obtaining in this matter as follows:

**“Though the applicant obtained a letter of allotment over the same property several years back it did not perfect it into a title and the 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> respondents who obtained another letter of allotment on 14<sup>th</sup> March, 1996 proceeded to obtain and transfer title in favour of the 6<sup>th</sup> respondent.”**

Earlier in the case of **Wreck Motor Enterprises Vs. Commissioner of Lands and 3 others**, Civil Appeal No.71 of 1997, the Court of Appeal stated the law thus:

**“Title to landed property normally comes into existence after issuance of a letter of allotment, meeting the conditions stated in such a letter of allotment and actual issuance thereafter of title document pursuant to provision held.”**

(Emphasis supplied)

For these reasons, it is clear that the applicants have not discharged the burden to show that they have a *prima facie* case. Regarding the 2<sup>nd</sup> principle for granting interlocutory injunction, the 2<sup>nd</sup> applicant purchased the plot at Kshs.140,000/= which can be reimbursed. Furthermore, since he purchased it in

1996, he had not taken possession until the 3<sup>rd</sup> respondent began to develop it 14 years later. The balance of convenience tilts in favour of the 3<sup>rd</sup> respondent who holds the title to the plot and is in possession.

For these reasons, the application fails and is dismissed with costs.

**Dated, Delivered and Signed at Nakuru this 15<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2011.**

**W. OUKO  
JUDGE**