

re-evaluate all the evidence to determine whether the conviction was based on sound evidence (**Okeno v. R. [1972] EA 32**). The court appreciates that it did not have the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses.

PW2 testified that he was attacked at the verandah and that the place was lighted by security lights. According to PW3 the incident was outside the gate. It is when she opened the gate that the attackers ran away. She stated that at the gate were security lights. The prosecution did not seek to clarify whether the attack was at the verandah or outside the gate.

Secondly, PW2 had been drinking from before 7.30 p.m. that evening. He went from bar to bar up to about 12.30 a.m before he decided to go home. He must have taken quite some beer. He was not asked by the prosecution what his capacity was. His judgment was certainly impaired by this lengthy drinking. That leaves only the evidence of PW3. That would be the evidence of a single witness. In **Odhiambo v. Republic [2002] 1 KLR 241, 247** the Court of Appeal had this to say:

“The law on identification is not in doubt. It has been stated and restated in several Judicial decisions by this Court and by the High Court. The court should receive evidence on identification with the greatest circumspection particularly where circumstances were difficult and did not favour accurate identification. Where evidence of identification rests on a single witness, and the circumstances of identification are known to be difficult, what is needed is other evidence either direct or circumstantial, pointing to the guilt of the accused persons from which, the court may reasonably conclude that identification is accurate and free from the possibility of an error.”

Regarding recognition (because that is the case here) in **R. v. Turnbull [1976] 3 ALLER 549 at page 552** Lord Widgery, C.J said as follows:

“Recognition may be more reliable than identification of a stranger, but even when the witness is purporting to recognize someone whom he knows, the jury should be reminded that mistakes in recognition of close relatives and friends are sometimes made.”

We are concerned that the trial court did not warn itself of the danger of convicting solely on the evidence of visual recognition at night and did not proceed to examine such evidence with care to minimize any case of mistake, or exclude any possibility of error. PW3 stated that she saw the Appellant by use of security light at the gate. She was, however, not asked to say how strong the light was, whether it fell on the face of the Appellant and for how long. Given the discrepancy between her evidence and that of PW2 on whether the incident was at the verandah or outside the gate, and given that the Appellant was not found with any of the stolen property and there was no other corroborating evidence regarding his participation, we find that the conviction was not safe.

It is for these reasons that we allow the appeal. The conviction is quashed and the sentence set aside. The Appellant is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith unless he is otherwise being lawfully held.

Dated, signed and delivered at Bungoma this 17th day of July 2012.

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L. KIMARU
JUDGE

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A. O. MUCHELULE
JUDGE